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NOTE
WITH FEDERAL MONEY UP FOR GRABS
AND THE CLEAN ENERGY DREAM WITHIN
REACH, THE NINTH CIRCUIT RUBBER
STAMPS THE CENTRAL DISTRICT’S
FLAWED JUDGMENT IN WESTERN
WATERSHED PROJECT V. SALAZAR: SHOULD
NEPA JURISPRUDENCE BE MODIFIED?
ERIK FAUSSNER

∗

“Conservation means development as much as it does protection. I
recognize the right and duty of this generation to develop and use
the natural resources of our land; but I do not recognize the right to
waste them, or to rob, by wasteful use, the generations that come
after us.”1—Theodore Roosevelt
INTRODUCTION
Gifford Pinchot is said to have coined the term “conservation” at the
turn of the twentieth century.2 As famous for his friendship with
President Roosevelt as he was for his seminal book “The Fight for
Conservation,” Pinchot fundamentally shaped the role government plays
in protecting the natural environment. In his book, Pinchot laid out the

J.D. Candidate 2015, Golden Gate University School of Law.
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, (Aug. 31, 1910), available at
PRESIDENTIALRHETORIC.COM,
www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/roosevelt_theodore/newnationalism.html.
2
Brian Manetta, John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and the Battle for Hetch Hetchy, ITHACA C.
HIST. J. (2002), www.ithaca.edu/history/journal/papers/sp02muirpinchothetchy.html (last visited Jul.
25, 2014).
∗

1

21

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
FAUSSNER (DO NOT DELETE)

22

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/26/14 2:53 PM

[Vol. 45

three principles of conservation: (1) development; (2) the prevention of
waste; and (3) ensuring that the use of natural resources is for the benefit
of the many, not the profit of the few.3 He recognized that the source of
the United States’ success related directly to the great wealth of its
natural resources.4 Ensuring that these resources are used wisely, he
believed, is the key to prosperity for generations to come.5
Since Pinchot’s death in 1946,6 a lot has changed. The United
States has advanced a great deal, and the fight to protect the natural
environment has extended globally to face the threat of climate change.
One thing has remained the same, however: the fight over
development—where to do it, how to regulate it, and what to protect.
Clean-energy development, and more specifically solar-energy
development, has been a hot issue in the early years of the twenty-first
century.7 Developers are rushing to build large-scale solar- and windenergy projects in the Southwest,8 to meet public demand to curb climate
change and to protect the natural environment from its ill effects. But
many of these projects are being developed in environmentally sensitive
areas, raising issues much the same as in Pinchot’s time.9 What is
different now is that there are rules and regulations designed to control
this development. Rules and regulations have to be enforced, though,
and with political pressure being applied to regulatory bodies in order to
make room for clean energy development, sometimes the principles laid
out by Pinchot get side-stepped.
As a clean-energy leader, California has been rapidly developing
clean-energy infrastructure to meet its goal of supplying 33% of its
electricity from renewable sources by 2020.10 The federal government
has also been an active participant in this push for a clean-energy future,
creating an atmosphere where big projects can thrive on federal land with

3

GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION ch. V (1910), available at
www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-h/11238-h.htm#2HCH7.
4
Id. ch. I, available at www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-h/11238-h.htm#2HCH3.
5
Id. ch. V, available at www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-h/11238-h.htm#2HCH7.
6
Gifford Pinchot (1865–1946), THE FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY (Aug. 25, 2014),
www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/people/Pinchot/Pinchot.aspx.
7
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE HISTORY OF SOLAR, available at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/solar_timeline.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
8
Todd Woody, A Solar Land Rush, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2009, 7:47 AM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/a-solar-land-rush/?_r=1.
9
See generally John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59 (2013).
10
Cal.
Exec.
Order
No.
S-14-08
(Nov.
17,
2008),
available
at
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=11072.
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help from the federal purse.11 With support from the state and federal
governments, large-scale clean-energy projects will become
commonplace in the California desert.12 The Southwest is an ideal place
for solar development because of its reliably sunny weather.13
Unfortunately, the rapid expansion of clean-energy infrastructure has
begun to pit clean-energy proponents squarely against conservationists,
turning traditional environmental allies against one another.14 These
different groups within the “green” movement have competing visions of
how to build the clean-energy future, and this policy disagreement leaves
vulnerable the Southwest’s limited natural resources and threatened
species.15
In Western Watersheds Project v. Salazar, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to weigh in on the
clean-energy expansion policy battle.16 Western Watersheds Project
(WWP), a nonprofit conservation group, filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by preparing a deficient
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in order to approve a large-scale
solar energy project.17
WWP requested that the district court
preliminarily and permanently enjoin BLM from taking actions to further
the project that could alter or change the physical environment, until it
complied with NEPA and its implementing regulations.18 The district
court denied WWP’s request for preliminary injunctive relief.19 On
WWP’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit issued a three-paragraph decision,
11

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar, Senator Reid Announce “FastTrack” Initiatives for Solar Energy Development on Western Lands (June 29, 2009), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2009_06_29_release.cfm; see also Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008, 26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014).
12
See Woody, supra note 8.
13
Ina Jaffe, A Renewable Energy Debate Heats Up in the Mojave, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(Apr. 23, 2010, 12:01 AM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126173547 (explaining
that the Mojave gets 360 days of sun each year on average).
14
Keith Matheny, Solar Energy Plans Pit Green vs. Green, USA TODAY (June 2, 2011, 1:18
PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/environment/2011-06-01-solar-energytortoise_n.htm.
15
Id.
16
See generally Nagle, supra note 9.
17
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar,
993 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex)), available at
www.westernwatersheds.org/legal/11/california/IvanpahComplaint_1-12-11.pdf.
18
Id.
19
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *72 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
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conclusory in its remarks and cursory in its review of the complex issues
involved, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
making its decision.20
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in deciding Western
Watersheds Project v. Salazar by not finding that the district court
abused its discretion in denying WWP’s request for a preliminary
injunction.
Preliminary injunctions have been environmental nonprofit
organizations’ most effective tool to enforce NEPA.21 Without the
ability to stop projects from proceeding before adequate environmental
review and analysis have occurred, these organizations have no way to
prevent environmental destruction between the time they file a lawsuit
and its final adjudication. If courts fail to recognize legitimate EIS
deficiencies and instead defer to biased agency opinions influenced by
government policy pressures, then NEPA will have lost its effectiveness
in ensuring agencies and the public are making fully informed decisions
before moving forward with large-scale project proposals. The decision
in this case will have a detrimental effect on threatened species and
sensitive ecosystems as more large-scale clean-energy projects are built
in the deserts of the Southwest. The district court’s decision to deny a
preliminary injunction, despite facts presented by WWP indicating BLM
violated NEPA, was an abuse of the court’s discretion that could set a
bad precedent for future litigation.
The Ninth Circuit has described abuse of discretion as “a plain
error, discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a
judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are
found.”22 The present case fits clearly into this description, but the
ultimate ruling fails to adhere to the appellate court’s precedent. The
basis for the court’s decision is rooted in its conclusion that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the four-factor test
set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.23 The
Winter formulation is the authoritative test federal courts use to grant
preliminary injunctions.24 According to Winter, a preliminary injunction
20

W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012).
Appeals Court Upholds Environmentalists’ Right to a Preliminary Injunction, ENV’T
NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 27, 2011), www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2011/2011-01-27-092.html (quoting
Susan Jane Brown, staff attorney for Western Environmental Law Center: “The preliminary
injunction is a critical tool for environmentalists because it allows opponents of a project to stave off
an imminent destructive project.”).
22
Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003).
23
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d at 922.
24
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sierra Forest Legacy v.
Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).
21
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may be granted if the plaintiff “establish[es] that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”25 Also, in the Ninth Circuit,
“‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that
tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary
injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of
irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”26 In
this case, the record showed that the district court failed to correctly
apply NEPA, which resulted in its misapplication of both of these
preliminary-injunction tests.
This Note will first discuss the threatened desert tortoise and the
solar project that catalyzed the dispute. Second, it will discuss the
outside pressures put on BLM and the district court by the State of
California and the federal government. Third, a brief background of the
case’s procedural history will be provided. Fourth, this Note will dissect
BLM’s most obvious violations of NEPA and the district court’s clear
error in failing to recognize those violations. Fifth, the Note will discuss
how the district court clearly erred in its application of the Winter factors
and the serious-questions test. Sixth, it will show how the Ninth Circuit
failed to apply its own standard in reviewing the district court’s decision
for abuse of discretion. And lastly, this Note will call for a bright-line
exception for clean-energy projects that would give courts flexibility in
regard to NEPA when disputes arise. This flexibility would allow courts
to approve clean-energy projects’ environmental reviews without setting
bad precedents that can be used to justify other types of development
projects.
A.

THE DESERT TORTOISE AND THE GIANT SOLAR FACILITY

The central character in this story is the desert tortoise, gopherus
agassizii, a creature unique to the Mojave Desert west of the Colorado
River.27 This species of tortoise spends much of its life underground in
burrows to protect itself from the extreme high and low temperatures that
occur in the desert.28 Individuals live roughly thirty to fifty years, but
25

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1021.
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that Ninth Circuit’s “serious questions” test survives Winter).
27
See generally Mike Jones, Gopherus agassizii (California) Desert Tortoise,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE (Cooper, 1863), available at http://eol.org/pages/456478/details.
28
MARK C. GROVER & LESLEY A. DEFALCO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST
SERVICE, INTERMOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION, DESERT TORTOISE (GOPHERUS AGASSIZII):
26
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few reach maturity due to the species’ extremely low reproductive rate
(only 2%–5% of hatchlings become adults).29 Unfortunately, California
populations of the desert tortoise are estimated to have declined by 90%
since 1940, with their habitat being reduced by 50–60% since the
1920s.30 These losses are mostly due to urbanization, agricultural
development, livestock and feral burro grazing, and mortality on roads.31
Because of the species’ dramatic decline and sensitivity, it was
listed in 1990 as “threatened” under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).32 Now the tortoise must face one more threat, the rapid
encroachment of solar- and wind-energy-generating facilities on its
habitat.
The facility encroaching on the tortoise’s habitat in the present case
is BrightSource Energy’s Ivanpah Solar Electric Generation System
(ISEGS or “Project”).33 The Project is the largest concentrated solar
energy facility in the United States, consisting of three 459-foot towers
with solar receivers on top and over 300,000 software-controlled mirrors
on the ground surrounding them.34 The mirrors work together by
tracking the sun in three dimensions to reflect the sunlight to the
receivers on top of the towers.35 The sunlight hitting the solar receivers
creates superheated steam, which is piped down to a conventional turbine
to create electricity.36 The facility produces over 370 megawatts of
power, enough to run 140,000 homes.37
This pinnacle of human ingenuity is a central player in the cleanenergy future, but it requires a lot of space and sunlight to operate. The
Project site is on federal land in the Ivanpah Valley, encompassing 5.4

STATUS-OF-KNOWLEDGE OUTLINE WITH REFERENCES, GEN. TECH. REP. INT-GTR-316, at 41-45
(July 1995).
29
Id.
30
NATURESERVE, DRAFT REGIONAL ASSESSMENT: STATELINE SOLAR FARM PROJECT 23
(2012) (citing KRISTIN H. BERRY, THE DISTRIBUTION AND ABUNDANCE OF DESERT TORTOISES IN
CALIFORNIA FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1960S AND A COMPARISON WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION
118–153 (1984)).
31
DESERT TORTOISE RECOVERY OFFICE, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MOJAVE
POPULATION OF THE DESERT TORTOISE (GOPHERUS AGASSIZII) 5-YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND
EVALUATION
22–44
(2010),
available
at
http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/five_year_review/doc3572.DT%205Year%20Review_FINAL.pdf.
32
Id.
33
Ivanpah Project Facts, IVANPAH, http://ivanpahsolar.com/about (last visited July 29,
2014).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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square miles of premium desert-tortoise habitat.38 This may seem like an
insignificant slice of the American Southwest, but it is only a small part
of the 4,536 square miles of desert-tortoise habitat energy companies
have requested from the BLM to build large-scale solar and wind
projects in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah to
date.39
WWP’s challenge to the Project focused on its large footprint,
which would destroy the tortoise’s habitat, and BLM’s deficient EIS,
which failed to adequately analyze the extent of the impact and
alternatives that could virtually eliminate any adverse impact.40 WWP’s
push for a preliminary injunction, however, would meet the full force of
a political establishment set on building the clean-energy future a new
administration had promised.41
B.

POLITICAL CAPITAL

At the time ISEGS was being considered, both the state and federal
governments had initiated the aggressive promotion of clean-energy
development.42 On June 29, 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar
announced the “Fast-Track” initiative for solar-energy development on
western lands.43 An integral part of the initiative was to increase the
speed of the review of industry proposals and their environmental
impacts (environmental impact statements, or EISs).44 At that time, the
federal government also had in effect two programs designed to
incentivize private companies to invest in clean-energy development: a
tax-credit program and a loan-guarantee program, set to expire in 2010
and 2011, respectively.45
The tax-credit program, entitled the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008, gave clean energy projects, like ISEGS, a 30%

38

Id.
Woody, supra note 8.
40
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 17, at 1-2.
41
BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA, available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama_New_Energy_0804.pdf (“The Obama-Biden
comprehensive New Energy for America plan will . . . [e]nsure 10 percent of our electricity comes
from renewable sources by, 2012, and 25 percent by 2025.”).
42
Cal. Exec. Order No. S-14-08, supra note 10; BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW
ENERGY FOR AMERICA, supra note 41.
43
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 11.
44
Id.
45
26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014); 10 C.F.R. pt. 609 (Westlaw 2014) (loan guarantees
for projects that employ innovative technologies).
39
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tax credit provided they were underway before the end of 2010.46 The
loan-guarantee program was an update to Title XVII of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, permitting the Secretary of Energy to make loan
guarantees for projects that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; and employ new or
significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial
technologies in service in the United States at the time the guarantee is
issued.”47 These two programs, in conjunction with the Department of
the Interior’s “Fast-Track” initiative, incentivized BLM to accelerate its
review of the Project’s EIS analysis to make sure it was approved in time
to receive the tax credit (estimated at $660 million with a Project cost of
$2.2 billion) as well as a $1.375 billion loan guarantee.48
California was also insistent that clean-energy projects be built
rapidly within its borders. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed
Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, in 2006.49 This
law gave the Air Resources Board authority to find ways to rapidly
reduce California’s carbon emissions by one third by 2020.50 The
incentives created by Assembly Bill 32 made California a helpful partner
for the federal government when the Obama Administration took the
helm in 2009 with hopes to act on the clean-energy portion of its
campaign platform.51
The clean-energy policy initiatives being pushed by the federal
government and California created an environment in which BLM felt
comfortable resisting any delay in the Project’s approval process,
allowing NEPA deficiencies to be swept under the rug even when the
public brought them to BLM’s attention.52 WWP and other conservation
organizations repeatedly presented their concerns about the Project’s
shortcomings to BLM. WWP submitted comments to the draft EIS
explaining that it failed NEPA’s “hard look” requirement because it did
not consider or analyze a location on the Ivanpah Dry Lake bed that
46

26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014).
74 Fed. Reg. 63,544, 63,549 (Dec. 4, 2009); see also, 10 C.F.R. §§ 609.1-609.18
48
Matheny, supra note 14.
49
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
38500 et seq. (Westlaw 2014).
50
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
38550 (West 2007).
51
Mary D. Nichols, First 100 Days: Obama’s First Climate Change Target, REUTERS (Jan.
22, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/01/22/first-100-days-obamas-first-climatechange-target/.
52
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
47
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would have allowed the Project to be built with virtually zero impact on
the desert tortoise, rare plants, and other scarce resources.53 BLM
dismissed WWP’s concerns.
Despite a multitude of serious deficiencies identified by WWP, in
the end the district court failed to acknowledge the merits of WWP’s
claims.54 Instead, the court deferred to BLM’s assurances and an amicus
curiae brief submitted by Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. of California,
denying the preliminary injunction requested by WWP.55 This denial
allowed the Project to move forward with construction, past the
proverbial “point of no return.” WWP exercised its only option by
appealing the decision to the Ninth Circuit.56 The appeal would not be
heard for nearly a year, allowing the Project to destroy the habitat WWP
sought to protect.57
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 6, 2007, the Bureau of Land Management published
notice of its intent to prepare a draft EIS and a final staff assessment to
amend the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA) plan to
accommodate the construction of the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating
System.58 The draft EIS was published on November 4, 2009, which
opened a review period for public comments that closed on February 11,
2010.59 WWP timely submitted comments to BLM explaining that the
Project would “have significant direct, indirect and cumulative impacts
on desert tortoises, rare plants and visual resources.”60 WWP also
highlighted BLM’s failure to adequately consider alternatives to the
Project and sufficiently document the Project’s impacts.61 After the
initial EIS, BLM obtained a biological opinion from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) that outlined the impact on the flora and fauna,
53

W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
54
See generally Id.
55
Id. at *71-2
56
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
57
Id.
58
Notice of Intent to Prepare a Joint Environmental Impact Statement and Final Staff
Assessment, and Amend the California Desert Conservation Area Plan; California, 72 Fed. Reg.
2,671 (Nov. 6, 2007).
59
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
60
Id.
61
Id.
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most importantly the desert tortoise, of the proposed project site.62 The
biological opinion described the measures that should be taken to limit
the detrimental effects on the tortoise and set an incidental take limit63 to
restrict the number of tortoises that could be removed from the site
without further investigation.64
On August 6, 2010, BLM published the proposed Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and opened a thirty-day publiccomment period.65 The concerns WWP raised were not addressed.
WWP again protested the proposed FEIS with timely comments on
September 3, 2010, explaining that the EIS was still unlawful under
NEPA because it did not consider adequately a location on the Ivanpah
Dry Lake bed that would have allowed the Project to be built without
detrimental impacts on the environment.66 Ignoring WWP’s comments
again, BLM issued a record of decision approving the proposal to amend
the CDCA Plan to include the ISEGS facility and grant the
authorizations necessary for the Project to begin pre-construction in
October 2010.67
In response, on January 14, 2011, WWP filed a complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for declaratory
and injunctive relief, requesting that the court “[p]reliminarily and
permanently enjoin all defendants from initiating any activities in
furtherance of the Project that could result in any change or alteration of
the physical environment unless and until defendants comply with the
62

See generally Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ventura Fish & Wildlife Office,
Ventura, Cal., to Dist. Manager, Cal. Desert Dist., Bureau of Land Mgmt., Moreno Valley, Cal. (Oct.
1,
2010),
available
at
http://docketpublic.energy.ca.gov/PublicDocuments/Regulatory/Non%20Active%20AFC’s/07-AFC5%20Ivanpah%20Solar%20Electric/2010/October/TN%2058750%2010-0110%20USFWS’%20Biological%20Opinion%20on%20ISEGS.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from
Field Supervisor, Ventura].
63
An incidental take limit is defined in the incidental take statement (ITS) of a biological
opinion. It “expresses the amount or extent of anticipated take of listed animal species caused by the
proposed action, along with reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the impact of take and
terms and conditions for which there must be compliance. . . . If the federal action proceeds and the
take of threatened or endangered species exceeds the level or extent exempted under the ITS, or if
the scope of the project changes, the federal agency must reinitiate its consultation with the
Services.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ESA REGULATORY REFORM: PROPOSED RULE GOVERNING
INCIDENTAL
TAKE
STATEMENTS;
QUESTIONS
AND
ANSWERS,
available
at
www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/pdf/ITS_FAQs.pdf (last visited July 29, 2014).
64
Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ventura, supra note 62, at 57.
65
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
66
Id.
67
Id. at *9.
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requirements of NEPA, ESA, .
.
.
and their implementing
68
regulations.” Despite the serious concerns raised in the lawsuit filed by
WWP, on March 2, 2011, BLM issued two notices to proceed with
ISEGS construction.69 Shortly after perimeter fencing had started, on
April 15, 2011, BLM had to issue a suspension decision to halt work,
because the construction process had found more desert tortoises than
allowed by the incidental-take limit set by the FWS’s biological
opinion.70 Multiple tortoises had been killed,71 which was a problem that
WWP had warned of in its EIS comments.
After consulting with FWS, on June 10, 2011, BLM determined that
the underestimate of the tortoise population was not an issue.72 It
decided that the new information did not significantly change the NEPA
analysis and that further public involvement to comment and review the
new and improved biological opinion and tortoise mitigation plan was
not necessary.73 That same day BLM gave the green light for
construction to resume.74
As a last resort, WWP filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on June 27, to halt
the Project from further destroying tortoise habitat until a new NEPA
review had been done.75 The District Court denied the TRO three days
later and set the matter for hearing on August 1 to determine the
preliminary injunction matter.76 On July 19, Governor Edmund G.
Brown Jr. filed an amicus brief in opposition to the preliminary
injunction.77 After the August 1 hearing, on August 10 the district court
entered an order denying the request for a preliminary injunction.78
WWP appealed the decision.

68

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 17, at 24.
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
70
Id. at *11.
71
Julie Cart, Saving Desert Tortoises Is a Costly Hurdle for Solar Projects, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/04/local/la-me-solar-tortoise-20120304.
72
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
73
Id.
74
Id. at *3.
75
Id. at *3.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at *72.
69
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On August 8, 2012, the matter was finally argued before the Ninth
Circuit.79 The Court affirmed the decision of the district court, finding
that there was no clear factual error or mistake of law in the lower court’s
analysis.80
II.

ANALYSIS

To facilitate a better understanding of the issues presented, this Part
will give a brief overview of the NEPA issues involved in this lawsuit,
concentrating specifically on portions of the law that are relevant to
illustrate shortfalls in both the district court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis. It will then go into detail to describe the mistakes of law in the
district court’s analysis of WWP’s NEPA claims. Then, this Part will
discuss how those mistakes of law led the district court to erroneously
apply the accepted preliminary-injunction tests and why that should have
compelled the Ninth Circuit to find that the district court abused its
discretion.
A.

NEPA VIOLATIONS

President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy
Act into law on January 1, 1970.81 NEPA’s central purpose is to give the
public a clear basis of choice82 between development actions by
requiring federal agencies to consider every significant environmental
impact of a proposed action before proceeding.83 NEPA accomplishes
this by informing the public about what the action is, by showing the
public that the relevant agency has evaluated the environmental
consequences of the proposed action, and by requiring analysis of a full
range of alternatives to the proposed action before proceeding.84
Considered a procedural statute, NEPA requires only that an agency fully
comply with the mandates in the statute, not that NEPA review lead to
any particular outcome.85
NEPA requires an EIS to have an adequate discussion and analysis
of a project’s direct and indirect environmental impacts, the impacts that
79

W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id.
81
LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33152, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2005).
82
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014); see also Watkins, 808 F. Supp. at 872.
83
LUTHER, supra note 81, at 1.
84
Id.; see also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 766–67 (9th Cir. 1982); Citizens for a
Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985).
85
LUTHER, supra note 81, at 1.
80
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would occur if no action were taken, and alternatives to the proposed
action.86 This framework is designed so that when an agency makes a
decision on a project, it “will have available, and will carefully consider,
detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts . . .
[and make the information] available to the larger audience [the public]
that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the
implementation of that decision.”87
In the present case, BLM’s most obvious violations of the NEPA
process included its failure to fully inform the public of the likely
environmental impacts of the Project and its failure to fully evaluate
alternatives to the proposal before proceeding.88 These violations are
illustrated by the EIS’s inadequate discussion of habitat fragmentation
caused by the Project and its failure to adequately analyze the “Ivanpah
Playa Alternative” to the Project, which would have essentially
eliminated impacts on the desert tortoise.
Either of these NEPA violations should have rendered the EIS
inadequate.89 However, the district court failed to grant a preliminary
injunction based on the deficient EIS. An injunction in this case would
have been warranted because it would not have significantly harmed
BLM or BrightSource Energy, it would have given BLM time to cure the
NEPA violations, and most importantly, it would have provided “a clear
basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public,”
which is the central purpose of NEPA.90 The district court abused its
discretion by not issuing the injunction despite evidence of NEPA
violations, “a judgment that [was] clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts as [were] found.”91
1.

Inadequate Discussion of Habitat Fragmentation

For an EIS to be lawful under NEPA, it must adequately discuss all
direct and indirect environmental impacts caused by an action that are
reasonably foreseeable.92

86

Id.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
88
See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. Fed. Highway Admin., 649 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2011).
89
See generally Block, 690 F.2d 753; see also Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 655 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2011).
90
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added).
91
Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003).
92
Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy, 655 F.3d at 1011.
87
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In this case, one reasonably foreseeable impact caused by the
Project was habitat fragmentation. Habitat fragmentation is the reduction
and isolation of the natural environment from a large patch to smaller
isolated patches, typically leading to negative outcomes in sensitive
ecosystems.93 The large footprint of the Project fragments the habitat of
the desert tortoise, inhibiting its movement and degrading its adjacent
habitat.94 This fragmentation “directly and adversely affect[s] habitat for
a threatened species.”95
Due to the fragmentation’s direct and indirect adverse impact on the
desert tortoise, it should have been discussed fully in the EIS. A full
discussion and analysis of probable environmental impacts is
characterized as a “hard look.”96 An adequate “hard look” in this case
would have included discussion of the type of fragmentation caused by
the Project and analysis of the impact the fragmentation would have on
the desert tortoise and other species.97 The discussion and analysis has to
be scientifically sound, including explanations of the methodologies used
(to make sure they are generally accepted), and the conclusions must be
based upon the scientific findings of the study.98
BLM’s EIS lacked all of these elements in its discussion of habitat
fragmentation. Instead, the EIS provided only general statements about
possible effects and risks to the tortoise.99 There was nothing in the way
of scientific analysis describing how bad the fragmentation would be, or

93

Alan B. Franklin, Barry R. Noon & T. Luke George, What Is Habitat Fragmentation?, 25
STUDIES
IN
AVIAN
BIOLOGY
20
(2002),
available
at
www.fws.gov/southwest/es/documents/R2ES/LitCited/LPC_2012/Franklin_et_al_2002.pdf.
94
Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13, W. Watersheds Project v.
Salazar, Case No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2011), available at
www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf.
95
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
96
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998).
97
Marble Mountain Audubon Soc’y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
Forest Service did not take a ‘hard look’ at the impact of the selected salvage and harvest alternative
on the Grider drainage biological corridor. Although the FEIS acknowledges that the Grider
drainage is a biological corridor, it does not contain a significant discussion of the corridor issue.
Instead, the FEIS concludes, without any apparent study or supporting documentation, that the
preservation of a ½-mile wide strip bisecting the drainage will be sufficient to maintain the
corridor.”).
98
40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (Westlaw 2014).
99
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CALIFORNIA DESERT
CONSERVATION AREA PLAN AMENDMENT/FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC GENERATING SYSTEM, FEIS-10-31, at 5-26 to -27 (July 31, 2010),
available at www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/ca/pdf/needles/lands_solar.Par.19048.File.dat/1CDCA-Ivanpah-Final-EIS.pdf.
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how exactly the fragmentation would effect the tortoise population.
These sorts of generalized statements do not constitute a “hard look” as
required by NEPA.100
The district court recognized this shortcoming in the EIS.101 The
court’s opinion went so far as to state that the deficiency “raise[d] a
serious question as to whether BLM violated NEPA by engaging in a
cursory discussion of habitat connectivity and fragmentation without
analyzing the potential impacts . . . on the . . . desert tortoise.”102 In fact,
the cursory discussion of indirect impacts of the Project was a violation
of NEPA, and it had been a fatal flaw in previous cases.103
In Marble Mountain Audubon Society v. Rice, the Ninth Circuit held
that the U.S. Forest Service (FS) failed the “hard look” requirement of
NEPA because its EIS lacked discussion or reasoned analysis of the
indirect impacts of a proposed project.104 The Northern District found
similarly in 2004, holding that when adverse indirect effects of a project
can be predicted, the agency must make their decision based on reasoned
discussion and analysis in an EIS to be valid under NEPA.105
Here the issue is much the same. BLM’s EIS recognized that the
Project would have adverse indirect impacts because of fragmentation,106
but it failed to further discuss the fragmentation and its impacts after
mentioning them. Many questions went unanswered, violating the
procedure and purpose designed into NEPA’s EIS requirement. “[T]he
purpose of the EIS requirement is to ensure that ‘to the fullest extent
possible’ agency decisionmakers have before them and take into proper
account a complete analysis of the project’s environmental impact.”107
BLM’s failure to include any reasoned analysis of habitat fragmentation
went squarely against the aforementioned EIS requirement, which is why
the district court’s decision to overlook the NEPA deficiency was an
abuse of discretion.108
100

Or. Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. (CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
102
Id. at *24.
103
Marble Mountain Audubon Soc’y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1990).
104
Id. (finding that EIS’s lack of discussion about the indirect impact on a biological corridor
was a violation of NEPA).
105
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
106
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 5-26 to -27 (“[The Project will] result in
habitat fragmentation, which is exacerbated by the presence of the . . . I-15 [and other area projects]
that effectively block the migration of terrestrial species from east to west.”).
107
City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975).
108
Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)
101
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The Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[w]here the information in the
initial EIS was so incomplete or misleading that the decisionmaker and
the public could not make an informed comparison of the alternatives,
revision of an EIS may be necessary to provide a reasonable, good faith,
and objective presentation of the subjects required by NEPA.”109 The
absence of the habitat fragmentation analysis in BLM’s EIS made it
impossible for BLM or the public to make an informed decision about
the Project and its alternatives. Every significant aspect of the direct and
indirect impacts of a project must be included in the EIS or it is deficient,
and the action should not move forward until the deficiency is cured.110
The district court’s decision to dismiss WWP’s claim was an abuse of
discretion, “a judgment that [was] clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts as [were] found.”111 The court should have granted the
requested preliminary injunction to give BLM time to remedy the
habitat-fragmentation deficiencies before allowing the Project to move
forward.
2.

Inadequate Discussion of the Ivanpah Playa Alternative

NEPA also requires federal agencies to rigorously explore and
evaluate reasonable alternatives to a proposed action in order to facilitate
informed decisionmaking.112
The alternatives analysis has been
described as the “heart” of the EIS.113 This section of the EIS is designed
to “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the
alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and
providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker
and the public.”114 The implementing regulations of NEPA state that
reasonable alternatives “include[] alternatives that are technically and
economically practical or feasible and meet the purpose and need of the
proposed action.”115 They also specify that the range of alternatives
“includes all reasonable alternatives, or when there are potentially a very
large number of alternatives then a reasonable number of examples

109

Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 811 (9th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added) (quoting Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1988)).
110
Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 655 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir.
2011).
111
Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977.
112
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (Westlaw 2014).
113
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997).
114
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added).
115
43 C.F.R. § 46.420(b) (Westlaw 2014) (implementation of National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969).
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covering the full spectrum of reasonable alternatives, each of which
must be rigorously explored and objectively evaluated . . . .”116
The purpose of rigorously evaluating a “full spectrum” of
alternatives is to foster a clear basis for choice.117 Looking at alternatives
that are at different sites is essential to an EIS because it helps
decisionmakers and the public weigh options with vastly different levels
of environmental impact.118 “The existence of a viable but unexamined
alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate” and
violates NEPA.119 The Project configuration that was analyzed in the
EIS and eventually chosen for development was described in the final
EIS as having “adverse environmental impacts to the biological
resources of the Ivanpah Valley, affecting many sensitive plant and
wildlife species and eliminating a broad expanse of relatively
undisturbed Mojave Desert habitat.”120 The alternatives analyzed by
BLM in its EIS did not satisfy NEPA’s requirement that the agency
rigorously explore and evaluate a “full spectrum” of alternatives.
The final ISEGS facility sits West of Highway I-15, in the middle of
what was undisturbed Mojave Desert habitat. Nearby Ivanpah Dry Lake
is a site that could have been developed under the Ivanpah Play
Alternative with virtually no adverse environmental impact on biological
resources. This alternative, however, was rejected by BLM without
rigorous exploration or objective evaluation.
In BLM’s EIS, out of twenty-five identified alternatives, most
(including the Ivanpah Playa Alternative) were quickly dismissed. Only
three alternatives were chosen for detailed analysis: Mitigated Ivanpah 3,
Modified I-15, and No Action.121 The Mitigated Ivanpah 3 Alternative
would have been on the same site as the original proposed Project.122
The main difference between this alternative and the problematic original
proposal was that it would have had a 12.5% smaller footprint and a
slightly different configuration.123 The Modified I-15 Alternative was
also on the same site as the original proposed Project, but it would have
reduced the footprint by the same 12.5% as Mitigated Ivanpah 3 in a
slightly different way.124 These two alternatives, though technically
116

Id. § 46.420(c) (emphasis added).
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014).
118
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982).
119
Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985).
120
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 6-1.
121
Id. at 3-5 to 3-6.
122
Id. at 3-26.
123
Id. at 3-27.
124
Id. at 3-36 to 3-38.
117
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different, would have done nothing except reduce by a small percentage
the amount of desert tortoise habitat that would be destroyed by the
Project through their smaller footprints and altered configurations.
The No-Action Alternative that was analyzed in the EIS did not
help fulfill the “full spectrum” of alternatives requirement either. A NoAction alternative is required procedurally by NEPA as a benchmark for
the public and decisionmakers to compare the proposed action and its
analyzed alternatives’ impacts to existing conditions without action.125
This left just the Mitigated Ivanpah 3 and Modified I-15 alternatives to
be objectively evaluated. This fact is disturbing because the two
proposed alternatives to the Project were, in fact, really not alternatives
at all. They were instead merely two different versions of the original
proposed Project, creating an illusion of choice in an attempt to satisfy
the alternatives analysis required under NEPA.
What was clearly missing from BLM’s EIS was the required “full
spectrum” of alternatives, including those on different sites with
significantly less environmental impact.126
NEPA’s implementing
regulations clearly call for alternatives from this spectrum to be
“rigorously explored and objectively evaluated.”127 BLM’s EIS failed to
analyze any true alternative to the Project, instead evaluating two
“alternatives” that were all on the same site, with similar environmental
impacts and with negligible differences between them.
These
alternatives also failed to address important objectives of the Project,
outlined by BLM in the Final Staff Assessment and Draft EIS.128
Two of those important objectives are to “reduce environmental
impacts” and “avoid siting the plant in areas that are highly pristine or
biologically sensitive.”129 Unlike the two alternatives that were fully
analyzed by BLM, siting the Project on the Ivanpah Dry Lake pursuant
to the Ivanpah Playa Alternative would have met or exceeded both of
those stated objectives along with five out of six other stated
objectives.130 This close fit with the stated objectives of the Project
125

DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:29 (2d ed. 2013) (“The noaction alternative provides a baseline against which action alternatives are evaluated.”).
126
43 C.F.R. § 46.420(c) (Westlaw 2014).
127
Id.
128
See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. & CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, FINAL STAFF
ASSESSMENT/DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC
GENERATING SYSTEM 07-AFC-5, at 2-5 to 2-6 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at
www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-700-2008-013/CEC-700-2008-013-FSA.PDF.
129
Id. at 2-6.
130
The only objective the siting alternative would not conform completely with is objective
number six, which aims to have the use comply with existing BLM land use objectives. The dry
lake is used by up to 5,000 people annually for land sailing. See id at 2-5 to 2-6.
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should have made a fair and detailed analysis of the Ivanpah Playa
Alternative an essential element of the EIS.131 The district court
however, decided that was not the case.132
In the EIS, BLM dedicated four short paragraphs to the Ivanpah
Playa Alternative and eliminated the proposed site because it “would not
be economically feasible, and would be inconsistent with current
management objectives for non-motorized recreation on the Dry Lake
bed.”133 This quick dismissal of the alternative, which would have
eliminated virtually all environmental impacts on threatened tortoises, is
puzzling.134 BLM cited the Lake Bed’s propensity to flood as the main
barrier to the alternative, commenting that diking could be done to
control flooding but that it would likely be economically infeasible.135
This cursory discussion, followed by a conclusory dismissal of an
alternative that avoided a great deal of environmental harm, violated
NEPA.136 BLM’s dismissal also went against the Ninth Circuit’s
instruction that agencies cannot dismiss alternatives that promote the
public interest in preventing irreparable environmental injury because of
possible economic barriers.137
Here, if the district court had followed the logic of the appellate
court’s precedent, it would have concluded that the public interest in
avoiding the irreparable injury to the tortoise and 5.4 square miles of its
habitat outweighed BrightSource Energy’s economic concerns. In
practice, the district court did quite the opposite, weighing heavily the
private investments of BrightSource Energy138 without exploring any
savings other alternatives could create.139

131

California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1982).
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *55 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
133
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 3-81.
134
Cf. Block, 690 F.2d at 767–68 (holding that U.S. Forest Service violated NEPA by not
considering an adequate range of alternatives, and noting that the dismissal of an alternative that had
a higher percentage of acreage allocated for wilderness use was “puzzling”).
135
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 3-81.
136
Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987)), overruled in part on other grounds by
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
137
Id. (“[T]he public interest in preserving nature and avoiding irreparable environmental
injury outweighs economic concerns . . . .”).
138
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *63 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
139
Strangely, the court didn’t even consider the cost savings the Ivanpah Playa Alternative
could have created because of the low impact on threatened species and plants when weighing the
132
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The court’s failure to consider BLM’s lack of discussion or analysis
of the cost of diking the Playa in its EIS was tantamount to it burying its
head in the sand to avoid recognizing the glaring NEPA deficiencies
present in BLM’s EIS. Without this analysis, it was impossible for BLM
to “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the
alternatives in comparative form . . . providing a clear basis for choice
among options by the decisionmaker and the public.”140 BLM’s failure
to complete an adequate analysis of the most feasible site location with
virtually no impact on threatened tortoises violated NEPA.141
The district court again failed to recognize this. It instead stated
that the “rule of reason”142 used by BLM correctly determined that a
lakebed prone to flooding was not consistent with operating an electrical
generating facility and thus was not a reasonable alternative.143
However, this was an erroneous use of the rule of reason. The rule of
reason is properly used to determine whether an EIS contains a thorough
discussion of probable environmental consequences, adequate in “form,
content and preparation foster[ing] . . . informed decision-making and
informed public participation.”144 This rule operates to give agencies
discretion not to explore every conceivable environmental impact, just
those that are within reason.145 BLM’s cursory dismissal of the Ivanpah
Playa Alternative, because of unexamined economic concerns and a
minor divergence from current management objectives, was not a proper
exercise of the agency’s discretion. Conversely, it was an unlawful
sidestepping of NEPA procedures, because it limited the range of
alternatives to essentially three versions of the same project proposal.146
economic concerns of BrightSource Energy. In fact, as of 2012, the cost of mitigating damage to the
tortoises on the Project site has cost $56 million. See Cart, supra note 71.
140
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added).
141
Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F. Supp. 852, 872 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that an EIS
should rigorously explore and evaluate a full spectrum of reasonable alternatives to a proposed
project); see also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982).
142
See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1150–51.
143
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *55 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
144
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1150–51 (9th Cir.
1997).
145
“[A]n EIS need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible details bearing on
the proposed action but will be upheld as adequate if it has been compiled in good faith and sets
forth sufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully the environmental factors
involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment
against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action, as well as to make a reasoned choice
between alternatives.” Cnty. of Suffolk v. Sec’y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977).
146
The original proposed Project, the Mitigated Ivanpah 3 Alternative, and the Modified I-15
Alternative. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 3-5 to 3-6.
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This action was contrary to NEPA’s goal of fostering informed
decisionmaking.
The Ninth Circuit has held that failing to include an adequate range
of alternatives is a violation of NEPA.147 In California v. Block, the State
of California brought suit against the FS for failing to comply with
NEPA by relying on an inadequate EIS to support its decision to allocate
roadless National Forest System land (RARE II).148 RARE II required
the FS to allocate over 62 million acres of National Forest System land
for different uses, which the FS categorized in “Wilderness,”
“NonWilderness,” or “Further Planning” designations.149 The State’s
biggest concern with FS’s EIS was its unfair minimization of the
environmental consequences of the Nonwilderness designation.150 The
State argued, and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California held in part, that NEPA had been violated because there was
not an adequate range of alternatives analyzed in the EIS.151
The district court took particular issue with the fact that the FS only
included alternatives that allocated 33% or less of National Forest
System land to the “Wilderness” designation.152 The court held that in
order for the EIS to comply with NEPA, it needed to include an
alternative that “[a]llocat[ed] to Wilderness a share of the RARE II
acreage at an intermediate percentage between 34% and 100%.”153 On
appeal by the FS, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding,
calling the inclusion of alternatives with higher percentages allocated to
Wilderness “essential to making a ‘reasoned choice.’”154 The court of
appeals explained:
The policy at hand demands a trade-off between wilderness use and
development. This trade-off, however, cannot be intelligently made
without examining whether it can be softened or eliminated by
increasing resource extraction and use from already developed areas.
The economic value of nonwilderness use is a function of its scarcity.
Benefits accrue from opening virgin land to nonwilderness use, but the
benefits’ worth depend upon their relative availability elsewhere, and
147

See generally Block, 690 F.2d 753.
Id.
149
See generally FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT:
ROADLESS
AREA
REVIEW
AND
EVALUATION,
(Jan.
1979),
available
at
www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5116928.pdf.
150
Block, 690 F.2d at 762.
151
Id. at 766–67.
152
Id. at 766.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 767–68.
148

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
FAUSSNER (DO NOT DELETE)

42

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/26/14 2:53 PM

[Vol. 45

the comparative environmental costs of focusing development in these
155
other areas.

A similar issue resulted from BLM’s lack of analysis of the Ivanpah
Playa Alternative. The policy at hand was a trade-off between
destroying 5.4 square miles of threatened species habitat, and developing
the Project on a site that would not have had that sort of environmental
impact. The fact that an alternative existed by which the Project could be
built without having such a high environmental cost required BLM to
conduct a rigorous exploration of the alternative. Without such analysis,
BLM, like the FS in Block, could not make a “reasoned choice.”156 BLM
was required to take a “hard look” at the Ivanpah Playa Alternative, and
its failure to do so rendered its EIS inadequate, violating NEPA. The
district court’s decision to dismiss WWP’s request for injunctive relief
was an abuse of discretion, “a judgment that [was] clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts as [were] found.”157
B.

MISAPPLICATION OF WINTER AND SERIOUS-QUESTIONS TESTS

With two stark violations of NEPA before the district court, it next
had to apply the principles of one of the two accepted preliminaryinjunction tests to determine whether equitable relief should be granted
to WWP. The court’s mistake of law in analyzing WWP’s NEPA claims
would lead to its misapplication of both of these tests.
A preliminary injunction may be granted when the plaintiff
establishes “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest.”158 Injunctive relief should also be granted if a plaintiff
raises serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships
tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, so long as the plaintiff shows that
there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the
public interest.159 The Ninth Circuit applies a “sliding scale” when
weighing the factors in these tests, allowing a strong showing on one
factor to make up for a weaker showing in another, so long as the

155

Id. at 767.
Id.
157
Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977.
158
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
159
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
156

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss1/7

22

Faussner: Should NEPA Jurisprudence Be Modified?
0021_FAUSSNER_FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Should NEPA Jurisprudence Be Modified?

11/26/14 2:53 PM

43

plaintiff shows a likelihood of irreparable injury and not just a possibility
of such injury.160
In the present case, the district court should have granted a
preliminary injunction because WWP was likely to succeed on the
merits, there were serious questions going to the merits of its claims,
absent injunctive relief WWP would have suffered irreparable harm, the
balance of the equities (if they had been properly analyzed) tipped in
WWP’s favor, and an injunction would have been in the public interest.
The four prongs of these tests may be combined into three categories: (1)
success on the merits and serious questions; (2) irreparable harm; and (3)
balance of the equities making a preliminary injunction in the public
interest (combining balancing of equities with the public interest because
the factors are interrelated).
1.

Success on the Merits and Serious Questions

Regarding the determination whether a claim will succeed on the
merits, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the standard for a
preliminary injunction requires only “that the plaintiff . . . show a
likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”161 As was
discussed in the previous section, WWP was likely to succeed on the
merits of its NEPA-violation claims,162 satisfying the merits prong of
Winter.
As for satisfying the alternate “serious questions” merits prong of
the test, the district court’s opinion stated outright that WWP “raise[d] a
serious question as to whether BLM violated NEPA by engaging in a
cursory discussion of habitat connectivity and fragmentation without
analyzing the potential impacts . . . on the . . . desert tortoise.”163 This
finding by the district court clearly indicated that WWP showed a
likelihood of success on the merits, which should have satisfied the
merits prong of the “serious questions” test.
According to both preliminary-injunction tests, WWP made a
showing that it had a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims,
and in the least it had raised serious questions. These findings, having
satisfied the first prong of both tests, next mandated that the court
160

Id. at 1131–35 (affirming continuing validity of the “sliding-scale” and “serious questions”
test standards post-Winter, 555 U.S. 7).
161
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987).
162
Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (Westlaw 2014).
163
Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14, W. Watersheds Project v.
Salazar, Case No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2011), available at
www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
FAUSSNER (DO NOT DELETE)

44

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/26/14 2:53 PM

[Vol. 45

determine whether, absent a preliminary injunction, WWP would have
suffered irreparable harm.164 The district court would again incorrectly
apply the standard.
2.

Irreparable Harm

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show
that irreparable harm is likely to occur if equitable relief is not granted.165
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the destruction of the
environment is inherently an irreparable injury.166 In fact, the district
court stated similarly in this case that “[t]he harm to the [tortoise]
population at the proposed site brought about by the loss of thousands of
acres of desert habitat is itself a sufficient irreparable injury to warrant
equitable relief.”167
Here, without a preliminary injunction the Project would certainly
have proceeded with construction and destroyed the desert tortoise
habitat WWP was attempting to protect with its request for equitable
relief. Because the habitat would be destroyed absent the court granting
a preliminary injunction, it followed that WWP would suffer irreparable
harm. This fact, along with the Supreme Court’s precedent recognizing
environmental harms as irreparable injury,168 show that WWP
demonstrated that without a preliminary injunction it was likely suffer
irreparable harm.
The district court, in its erroneous order, found that an injunction
would not likely prevent any irreparable injury to WWP.169 If it had
found that irreparable harm was likely absent a preliminary injunction,
the court would next have been required to balance the equities to
determine whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public
interest.170

164

Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
166
See Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545.
167
Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 32, W. Watersheds Project v.
Salazar, Case No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added), available at
www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf.
168
Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545.
169
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *72 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
170
Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1138-39 (weighing, in part, the irreparable
environmental harm of an action against economic considerations that would be harmed if an
injunction were granted).
165
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Balance of Equities and the Public Interest

The Ninth Circuit has determined that, in deciding whether a
preliminary injunction would be in the public interest, a court should
balance equitable considerations, and based on that analysis, determine
whether a “critical public interest” would be harmed if a preliminary
injunction were to be granted.171 In this case, the equities the district
court should have balanced were the irreparable harm that would be done
to the tortoise and its habitat if it did not grant a preliminary injunction,
against the public interests that would be harmed by the injunction’s
delay of the Project until the NEPA violations had been remedied.172
The district court instead erroneously balanced the irreparable harm
to the tortoise against the harm an injunction could cause the Project’s
expected contribution to “state and federal goals for the increased use of
renewable energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; . . .
BrightSource[‘s expenditure of] more than $712 million constructing the
project to date; . . . [the Project’s potential] impact upon hundreds of
workers and state revenues; . . . and [WWP’s delay] bringing its motion
for a preliminary injunction until after the project was well underway.”173
This balancing of the equities was erroneous because it incorrectly
balanced the irreparable harm the Project would cause the tortoise,
against the harm to public interests that would have been caused if the
Project were not built at all. It created a framework for analysis based on
the false premise that a preliminary injunction would have killed the
Project. Preliminary injunctions are not permanent and are intended in
the context of NEPA to halt environmental destruction only until the
procedural requirements of NEPA are adhered to,174 so that a fully
informed decision can be made.175
If the court had applied the law correctly, it would have balanced
the irreparable harm the Project would cause the tortoise, against the
harm to the public interests that would have been caused by the delay of
construction. Because a preliminary injunction would be in effect only
until BLM had cured its EIS’s deficiencies, the delay would not have
affected “state and federal goals for the increased use of renewable
171

Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1138-39.
173
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *68-9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
174
S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 728 (9th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
175
Block, 690 F.2d at 767.
172
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energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions” or “workers and
[contribution to] state revenues.”176 The delay would have been
temporary, and the Project would have moved forward once the EIS was
adequate under NEPA. Because construction would have recommenced
after NEPA violations had been cured, there was virtually no risk of
causing harm to the state and federal objectives of the Project. The
district court expressed concern that a delay could “frustrate” federal and
state public policies underlying the Project’s funding and financial
incentives it could qualify for.177 This concern was unwarranted and
improper, because the delay needed to cure the EIS deficiencies for
which WWP had meritorious claims (inadequate habitat fragmentation
and alternatives analyses) would not have been long enough to be fatal to
the Project’s financing.178 ISEGS would still have received government
money if its completion timeline had been delayed.
The district court also erroneously considered BrightSource
Energy’s potential financial hardship resulting from delay as a balancing
factor. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that courts and agencies may
“not . . . consider the [private] investments made on the basis of a
defective EIS,” especially when construction moves forward “with full
awareness of the [plaintiff’s] suit and . . . [proceeding is a] gamble on the
EIS being [found] adequate.”179 BLM, and by extension BrightSource
Energy, recognized WWP’s issues with the EIS as early as February 11,
2010,180 and knew of the lawsuit as of January 14, 2011.181 Despite its
collective knowledge of the serious concerns raised by WWP, BLM
issued notices that allowed construction to start on March 2, 2011, and
BrightSource began the process of installing perimeter fencing around
the Project site.182 The court’s decision to discuss and emphasize the
economic loss private investors would suffer due to any delay of the
Project illustrates its grave error in its balancing-of-the-equities

176

W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *67-8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
177
Id. at *62.
178
See 10 C.F.R. pt. 609 (Westlaw 2014); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014).
179
N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988).
180
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazargee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
181
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 17, at 24.
182
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss1/7

26

Faussner: Should NEPA Jurisprudence Be Modified?
0021_FAUSSNER_FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Should NEPA Jurisprudence Be Modified?

11/26/14 2:53 PM

47

analysis.183 This erroneous analysis led the district court to consider the
public-interest prong of both preliminary injunction tests based on a false
premise.
The accepted analysis used to determine whether granting a
preliminary injunction is in the public interest, as determined by the
Ninth Circuit, requires a court to consider whether a “critical public
interest” would be harmed if the preliminary injunction were to be
granted.184 In this case, that called for measuring the harm to the public
interest caused if the Project were delayed, against the well-established
“public interest in preserving nature and avoiding irreparable
environmental injury.”185 The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that
suspending a project until environmental concerns are cured “comports
with the public interest” in many cases.186
The Supreme Court has similarly accepted that “[e]nvironmental
injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money
damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e.,
irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of
harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the
environment.”187 With the likelihood of irreparable environmental injury
certain in this case, a preliminary injunction would have served the
public interest, delaying the Project only until BLM made its EIS’s
analysis lawful under NEPA. A “critical public interest” would not have
been harmed in this case if a preliminary injunction had been granted; it
would merely have been delayed. A delay could certainly have added
cost to the Project, but private losses incurred because of a deficient EIS
are not something the court can lawfully consider.188
The facts in the record illustrated that WWP showed a likelihood of
success on the merits of its claims, that it would have been irreparably
harmed if a preliminary injunction were not granted, and that issuing an
injunction was in the public interest because it would have avoided
183

W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *67-8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
184
Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1138.
185
McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005 (en banc) (discussing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531 (1987)), overruled in part on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008).
186
S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone, 588 F.3d at 728 (per curiam) (“As to the public
interest, Congress’s determination in enacting NEPA was that the public interest requires careful
consideration of environmental impacts before major federal projects may go forward. Suspending a
project until that consideration has occurred thus comports with the public interest.”).
187
Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added).
188
N. Cheyenne Tribe, 851 F.2d at 1157.
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irreparable injury to the environment without harming the critical public
interest in developing clean-energy infrastructure. The district court’s
decision to deny temporary equitable relief to WWP, despite the record,
was an abuse of discretion.189
C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT’S
DECISION BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON A MISTAKE OF LAW AND
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

The Ninth Circuit holds that a “district court abuses its discretion
when its equitable decision is based on an error of law or a clearly
erroneous factual finding.”190 In this case, the district court made its
decision to deny equitable relief despite evidence that should have
compelled it to grant a preliminary injunction.191 The court’s action was
an abuse of its discretion because the decision was based on its erroneous
application of NEPA and the two accepted preliminary-injunction tests.
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the district court’s mistake of
law and abuse of discretion was erroneous.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision without
examining its NEPA analysis and without discussing its application of
the first two prongs of the Winter test.192 The appellate court’s limited
discussion of the balancing of the equities factor and the public-interest
factor of Winter to justify the district court’s decision completely ignored
the court’s obligation to reverse when an error of law or a clearly
erroneous factual finding exists.193 If the court had analyzed the district
court’s NEPA analysis and all prongs of the Winter and the “Serious
Questions” tests, then it would have reversed the lower court’s decision.
This leaves the glaring question of why the Ninth Circuit felt it pertinent
to overlook the flawed judgment of the district court.
The most illuminating clue to why the Ninth Circuit did not
determine that the district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion is
embodied in its commendation of the lower court’s balancing and
weighing of the equities.194 The opinion focused on the fact that the
district court properly weighed federal and state goals when determining

189

Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977 (“a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
as found”).
190
United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 1998).
191
Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977.
192
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012).
193
United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d at 642.
194
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d at 923.
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that injunctive relief was not in the public interest.195 This approbation
overlooked, however, the fact that the district court only came to that
conclusion after erroneously evaluating BLM’s EIS analysis and WWP’s
NEPA claims.196
Further, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider the district court’s
puzzling decision to deny preliminary injunctive relief despite the fact
that it stated in its opinion that WWP “raise[d] a serious question as to
whether BLM violated NEPA,”197 and that “[t]he harm to the [tortoise]
population at the proposed site brought about by the loss of thousands of
acres of desert habitat . . . [was] itself a sufficient irreparable injury to
warrant equitable relief.”198 This oversight, in combination with Ninth
Circuit’s deviation from the Supreme Court’s holding that irreparable
environmental injury typically favors preliminary injunctive relief, only
further calls into question the court’s motivation to affirm the district
court’s faulty judgment.199
It is certainly true that by the time this case was argued before the
Ninth Circuit the Project was well on its way to completion,200 but to
paper over obvious errors in the district court’s analysis was
disingenuous. The policy considerations the appellate court focused on,
though an important factor for deliberation, cannot override the evidence
illustrating that the district court made a mistake of law.201 The Ninth
Circuit’s emphasis on discussing the importance of building clean-energy
infrastructure, however agreeable and insightful it may be, did not do
anything to address the errors the district court’s ruling was based upon.
The district court abused its discretion by rendering a decision “that

195

Id. (“The district court properly took into account the federal government’s stated goal of
increasing the supply of renewable energy and addressing the threat posed by climate change, as
well as California’s argument that the ISEGS project is critical to the state’s goal of reducing fossil
fuel use, thereby reducing pollution and improving health and energy security in the state.”).
196
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“Under this deferential standard, we must defer to an agency’s decision that is ‘fully informed and
well-considered.’ However, we need not forgive a ‘clear error of judgment.’” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
197
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *25-6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
198
W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151556, at *58 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-vsalazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012).
199
Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545.
200
Christian Roselund, Waiting on Ivanpah, CLEAN TECHNIA (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://cleantechnica.com/2014/02/21/ivanpah-solar-power-plant-isnt-quite-complete/.
201
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[was] clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as found.”202 The
Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the lower court’s mistakes of law and
clearly erroneous factual findings sets a bad precedent.
The reality of the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision sits solely
with the judges involved, but the brevity of the order certainly disguised
the complexity of the issues raised in this case. This decision may lead
to a future in which conservationists have no power to temporarily halt
projects that have been approved by federal agencies that have not done
their due diligence. Projects could be approved without the government
considering every significant environmental impact, without the public
being adequately informed of what the proposed actions are, and without
sufficient evaluation of the environmental consequences and alternatives
to the actions before proceeding.203 But the importance of building
clean-energy infrastructure does raise a serious question; should courts
recognize an exception to NEPA requirements for clean-energy projects
because of their important role in reducing carbon emissions that
contribute to climate change and its macro-effect on the environment?
CONCLUSION
Yes. Development designed to use limited natural resources in a
way that benefits the many over the few without waste is what Gifford
Pinchot dreamed for the future.204 Large-scale clean-energy projects
undoubtedly fit into his idea of “conservation” because they give society
electricity without continuously pumping carbon into the atmosphere. In
the face of climate change and in the midst of a stagnating economy, the
benefits of these projects are immense, and they are something all
“conservationists” should get behind. The Ninth Circuit recognized
these benefits, and its decision certainly helped one of these projects
steamroll through construction, but it could also help undermine the
regulatory framework designed to support smart development.
NEPA was the culmination of the principles set out by Pinchot:205
regulations designed to make sure that when development occurs, it
proceeds in the most beneficial manner possible, both for people and the
natural environment.206 The danger created by the Ninth Circuit’s
rubber-stamping of the district court’s flawed NEPA analysis is that
future projects that do not have such great environmental benefits can
202
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204
PINCHOT, supra note 3, ch. 1.
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rely on precedent to thwart requests for preliminary injunctions made by
conservation groups like WWP.
The best way to protect the NEPA framework, which has helped
promote smarter development over the past forty years, is to create
within it a bright-line exception for clean energy projects to give them
flexibility to build quickly and efficiently. Development always has
environmental consequences, but clean-energy projects differ in one
important way. Although they have local detrimental effects, on a global
scale they help reduce carbon emissions. If these projects don’t move
forward quickly, climate change may never be curtailed, and if that
happens it may be too late for species like gopherus agassizii.
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